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Declassification Instructions For This National Intelligence Survey Volume

Country:	Communist China
Report Title:	Subversion

NIS Series Number:	39A	Box Number:	197
Chapter Number:	5	Volume Number:	21
Section Number:	57	Total Pages:	29
Publication Date:	01-Jan-61		

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57. *Subversion*

The user can supplement the information in this Section by referring to NIS 39, Section 50, Introduction, for an overall view of the history, problems, and distinctive political characteristics of the country. The strength and effectiveness of forces for the suppression of subversion are discussed in NIS 39A, Sections 56, Intelligence and Security, and 54, Public Order and Safety. Foreign propaganda efforts to foment unrest and domestic propaganda efforts to inculcate loyalty are discussed in NIS 39A, Section 58, Propaganda.

A. General

During their first decade of rule, the Chinese Communists have managed to create a strong and highly centralized government which has established effective control over the mainland of China. Through police-state domination and mass propaganda methods, the regime has largely eliminated both the means and will of the people currently to mount resistance activities capable of overthrowing its authority.* The current pattern of subversive capabilities and trends has changed radically from the period immediately preceding the Chinese Communist rise to power. There are no longer any rival political parties backed by substantial military forces competing for control of the central government. The Government of the Republic of China (G.R.C.) on Taiwan maintains a threatening posture, but no foreign power poses a threat to the central government as did the Japanese challenge of earlier years. Traditional foci of resistance efforts such as former Kuomintang (KMT) officials, local landlords, family associations, and secret societies have been eliminated, banned, or replaced by mass organizations which serve now as instruments of state control. Although Peiping has occasionally modified objectionable features of its policies in response to popular opposition, it has nonetheless pushed forward relentlessly with its general program of imposing the Communist pattern on mainland China. Thus, the major type of opposition confronted by the Chinese Communists today is passive in nature and reflected, for the most part, in the growth of disillusionment, resentment, and disaffection among the population.

Nevertheless, and despite an era of totalitarian rule extending back to 1949, the Chinese Communists are still compelled to cope with isolated instances of revolt, economic sabotage, and other forms of resistance. The Tibetan revolt of March 1959 was a case in point, and places in sharp focus the general question of the level and significance of the opposition, passive though it presently may be. Large sectors of the population remain strongly opposed to Communist policies, and this factor assumes added importance because of the presence of the G.R.C. as an alternative center of allegiance for the Chinese people. The geographical proximity of the Nationalist Government, its possession of large military forces, its propaganda potential, and its close ties with the United States compound the threat to the Peiping regime.

The elaborate mechanism developed by the Chinese Communists to enforce their rule is indicative of the extent to which the regime is determined to eliminate all forms of subversion. Nonetheless, although organized resistance has been countered with arbitrary and ruthless suppression, a highly centralized internal security system, an oppressive legal structure, flexible policies, and pervasive propaganda operations, available information indicates a raising of the level of dissidence in recent years, particularly among the peasantry, intellectuals, religious and ethnic groups, and students. Peasant dissatisfaction has been intensified by the forced establishment of communes begun in 1958, and by the regime's failure to fulfill its promises of increasing peasant income and of improving the supply of consumer goods. Many intellectuals were disillusioned by a 1957 drive against "rightists," and they chafe under the regime's restrictive policy. Muslims and Buddhists, in particular, have been shocked by the ruthlessness and unconciliatory policies pursued by the Communists toward Tibet and by a sudden realization of the implications behind Peiping's attitude toward its minority groups. The lesson of Tibet to Communist China's minorities is probably still too vivid to be balanced against the introduction of a unified school system, improved health and sanitation measures, and the integration of the Tibetan economy with all of mainland China. Some of the youth groups, particularly those composed of students, have lost their initial feeling of exhilaration

* For purposes of this Section, "dissidence" means a state of mind involving discontent or disaffection with the regime; "resistance" is dissidence translated into action; and "organized resistance" is resistance carried out by a group of individuals who have accepted a common purpose, agreed on leadership, and worked out a communications system.

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and have been disillusioned by the regimentation, by uncertain prospects for educational and professional advancement, and by the mundane and austere aspects of future economic progress.

Despite the increased level of dissidence, the regime has demonstrated sufficient flexibility to keep it within manageable limits thus far. Some of the more extreme provisions of the original commune program have been modified even though Peiping has continued to push ahead for its application to urban areas. While open criticism of the regime has in recent years been effectively curtailed, many outspoken critics, after thorough "self-criticism," reorientation, or "reform through labor," have been reinstated in their positions or otherwise "exonerated" of their "crimes." The energies of youth have been redirected to the achievement of new national objectives, additional responsibility has been placed in their hands, and their attention often focused on supposed external threats.

Although the regime in more recent years has relied to a large degree on the techniques of persuasion and intimidation to control the pressures and strains caused by its ambitious programs, Peiping has the power to enforce its policies when all other tactics fail. When the level of organized resistance in Tibet reached intolerable proportions, Peiping abandoned its earlier policy of gradually introducing "social reforms" and imposed the Communist pattern upon Tibet by military force. Peiping's willingness to resort to such tactics not only reflected the power of its arms, but also demonstrated a high degree of unity in the Party on this issue and of loyalty in the military and police forces.

B. Character and extent of pre-1949 subversive activities

Chinese society has historically been characterized by the maintenance of stability not through the operations of extensive government machinery but through the employment of less formal, essentially local, modes of social and economic control. Social pressures exerted by the family, the guilds, and other associations, the permeation of all levels of society with Confucian doctrine which justified the traditional way of life, and the pragmatism and materialism of the Chinese character made it possible for the people to achieve social stability and economic viability without any great degree of intervention or direction from the government (see NIS 39, CHAPTER IV, SECTION 42, under Social Organizations and Movements).

Until the middle of the 19th century the monarchial or emperor system of government in China remained essentially unchallenged. Despite the absence of politically inspired activities aimed at the overthrow of the traditional system of government, however, there were continuous struggles among the elite against a background of periodic peasant rebellions to obtain control of the administrative apparatus.

Within the elite of the scholar-gentry (see NIS 39, CHAPTER IV, SECTION 42, under Social Structure) the contest for power was one for personal shares of the emperor's totality of governmental power. Under the Confucian system the emperor was comparable in status to the father of a family, and the extent of personal ties with him determined the amount of power held by lesser members of the great Chinese family. There were no political parties in the modern sense, but only competing cliques jockeying for position. Furthermore, these cliques did not hold divergent views on the fundamental structure of the state.

The peasantry, on the other hand, became a political force only sporadically. Decay in the administration was frequently followed by convulsive rebellions, in which the peasants struck out blindly in protest against official oppression and economic maladjustment. Larger and more sustained rebellions were often the occasion for a change of dynasty. However, like the intrigues and palace coups among the elite, these rebellions were not caused by a desire for revolutionary change in the mode or pattern of government but were a turning against the individuals holding and, in this case, abusing political power.

The secret societies at times played a role in these rebellions. These societies were fraternal associations organized for the mutual welfare of members, particularly when economic and social pursuits took them beyond the protecting circle of the family. Various motivations drew persons to these societies, which not only appealed to superstition but also offered both social-recreational interest and economic advantage. Such societies were composed largely of peasant and other rural elements although top posts in them sometimes gravitated to the landlords.

The aims of the secret societies varied. Some were strictly religious, others were self-protective associations, mutual benefit organizations, or racketeering groups. All the societies had in common two characteristics: 1) secrecy of membership, ritual, esoteric cant, and methods of identification, and 2) a loosely hierarchic organization, so authoritarian that top leaders could sometimes bend the society to their own ends, and yet so decentralized that exposure of one unit or branch did not expose the whole society. Obligations were mutual in that members pledged unquestioned loyalty to the society in return for the society's assistance. These societies were potential chan-

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nels for political activity should oppression increase and government weaken. Local oppression bred local opposition of the Robin Hood type, but this disorganized opposition constituted potential subversion if it were unified by a strong leader and directed against the ruling dynasty. Hence, upon gaining power, Chinese leaders have traditionally attempted to suppress or to control secret societies.

The conquest of China in 1644 by alien Manchus from the north added an element of xenophobia to the objectives of certain secret societies. Loyalist supporters of the preceding native dynastic house founded a variety of secret societies in South China with rituals reflecting their loyalist anti-Manchu beginnings. These southern societies carried this latent xenophobia abroad with the emigration of southern Chinese to overseas communities during the 19th century.

Sun Yat-sen (1866–1925), the father of the Chinese revolution, reoriented the loyalist secret societies; instead of their antiofficial and antidynastic leanings, he gave them the subversive aim of overthrowing the form and structure of government, not merely its personnel. During 40 years of revolutionary activity until his death on March 12, 1925, Sun was in constant contact with the south China secret societies and especially with their overseas branches in the United States and Southeast Asia. Although Sun received much of his financial support from secret societies, he did not rely on them for leadership, drawing most of his leaders from intellectual groups.

In 1894 Sun Yat-sen founded the *Hsing Chung Hui* (Revive China Society), patterning it after the traditional secret societies and endowing it with a reformist dedication to a constitutional monarchy. While in Japan in 1905, Sun established a stronger organization, the secret and revolutionary *T'ung Meng Hui* (Alliance Society). The *T'ung Meng Hui* had the stated aim of overthrowing the imperial system by military force and adopted a program calling for three years of martial law, six years of provisional constitutional government, and the establishment of a constitutional republic. With the intermittent backing of Japanese, some of whom held high political positions, Sun and the *T'ung Meng Hui* organized about 10 armed insurrections directed chiefly against south China. These insurrections set the stage for the revolt at Wuhan in central China on October 10, 1911, and the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty.

Sun Yat-sen became Provisional President of the Republic of China on January 1, 1912, but shortly thereafter resigned this post in the interest of national unity and brought his organization into the open as the Kuomintang (KMT), or National People's Party. Parliamentarianism and open political organizations, however, were no match for the military power of the northern warlords who dominated the newly formed Republic. During the next decade provincial warlordism overran the country. Sun withdrew to the south where his party again went underground, from 1913 to 1920, under the name of the *Ko Ming Tang*, or Revolutionary Party.

A rising nationalism evidenced by the student riots of May 4, 1919, protesting the Versailles settlement, increased popular interest in revolutionary activity. At about the same time, the newly established U.S.S.R. became interested in China, and Soviet agents approached Sun, securing his acceptance not only of Russia's international moral support but also of the services of professional Soviet revolutionaries. Sun subsequently accepted Soviet Communist assistance in reorganizing the KMT, and he broadened its base by introducing the Communist system of small local cells. Sun also recast his plea for nationalism in order to utilize the Leninist slogan of "anti-imperialism" against China's "unequal treaties."

The revitalized KMT soon possessed a well-knit organization, with a broad base of support, equipped with both an effective rallying cry and the nucleus for effective military action. With the help of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propagandists, the KMT in 1926 began its northward march to power. In the following year the new National Government was established in Nanking under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek.

The National Government faced the threat of overthrow from two directions, each increasing the danger from the other. Both Japan and the Chinese Communists were pitted against Chiang Kai-shek's government. Japan seized Manchuria in 1931 and shortly set up a puppet regime through which Japanese rule was maintained. The Japanese continued thereafter to exert pressure against north China until the outbreak of hostilities with China in 1937. The National Government and President Chiang tried to prevent provincial leaders from making private deals with the Japanese. Most provincial leaders had refused to surrender their warlord powers, particularly their private military forces, and the central authorities consequently had little control over them. Japanese subversive activities were directed primarily at these leaders on the periphery of Japan's advance but also included smuggling and other efforts to undermine Nationalist strength throughout the country.

After 1927 the National Government faced the internal threat of Chinese Communist subversion. In the 1923–24 reorganization of the KMT, Chinese Communists had been admitted into Sun's party. The assistance provided by Soviet Communists and the work accomplished by the Chinese Communists in organizing labor and spreading

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propaganda well in front of the advancing KMT northern expedition of 1926–27 greatly aided the Nationalist cause. Problems of discipline and divided loyalties, however, led the KMT to break with the Chinese Communists in 1927 and to treat them thereafter as subversives. Although the purge of the Communists temporarily disrupted the CCP organization and drove most of it from urban centers, scattered remnants regrouped themselves in the countryside. The Communists established a Chinese Soviet Republic in rural south-central China in 1931, the same year in which Japan seized Manchuria.

Subsequently, KMT activity against the Communists followed two lines. First, the KMT used military force supported by an economic blockade. It took five major military expeditions to dislodge the Communists and to send them retreating on their "Long March" toward Yen-an in the northwest in 1934. Second, the KMT adopted various security measures in an attempt to prevent the further spread of Communism. Very shortly after the proclamation of the Chinese Soviet Republic, Chiang established the *Lan I*, sometimes referred to as the "Blue Shirt" organization, in a move to tighten the internal discipline and loyalty of his party. This highly secret group, formed from a strong core of graduates of the Whampoa Military Academy, operated chiefly to maintain the position of Chiang Kai-shek within the KMT and the government. A later overt manifestation of the Blue Shirt organization was the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics (BIS) (see NIS 39B, SECTION 56, under Domestic Intelligence). The BIS, although also operating to suppress deviation within the party and the government, had the primary task of watching over the populace as the government's secret police. In addition to the Blue Shirts and the BIS, Chiang employed other secret organizations of a more local nature, such as the *Ch'ing Pang*, whose strong-arm methods had wiped Communist influence from the Shanghai labor unions in 1927. The successes of these KMT organizations were more in the realm of suppression and control of overt Communist activity than in infiltration or subversion of the Communists.

The CCP in its rise to power had considerable experience in subversion and underground activity. When forced to withdraw from open politics in the 1927 purge, the CCP was thrown back largely on its own resources in the countryside. Even after the Long March had brought them physically closer to the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists received little support from Moscow beyond directives on the Party line and encouragement. According to available information, the CCP received only negligible financial, material, or direct technical assistance from Moscow until after the defeat of Japan.

During their stay in Yan-an from 1935 to 1949, the Communists developed an exceedingly tight Party organization and obtained considerable support for their then moderate domestic program from the general population under their control. Because of this internal solidarity, the CCP was far less troubled than the KMT by problems of clique intrigues within the Party or adverse public criticism. Accordingly, the CCP was able to concentrate on developing techniques of guerrilla warfare, espionage, sabotage, and political subversion. It also devised highly effective measures against the subversive tactics employed against it. Neither the Japanese nor the KMT had much success with subversive activities against the Communists during the war years.

The Axis defeat in 1945 ended the triangular situation in China with the removal of Japan, but the KMT-CCP contest continued. For a few months the struggle was waged on a political plane, accompanied by intensive and chiefly Communist-inspired subversive activity, but it quickly entered a military phase. As the military struggle drew to a close in 1949, when the Communists established a government at Peiping and the Nationalists withdrew to Taiwan, the contest between the two regimes again became primarily covert.

By October 1949 the regime had begun to consolidate its power and install an apparatus of intimidation and control over the population which basically duplicated that of the U.S.S.R. (For a more detailed discussion of the developments after the Communist seizure of power, see this Chapter, SECTION 53, Political Dynamics; the control apparatus is described in SECTION 54, under Police System, and SECTION 56, under Ministry of Public Security.)

C. Chinese Communist sanctions against subversion

All regulations and directives of the Chinese Communist regime directed against subversive activity stem from Article 7 of the Common Program (see this Chapter, SECTION 51, under Principal Features of the Chinese Communist Constitution):

> The People's Republic of China must suppress all counterrevolutionary activities, severely punish all Kuomintang counterrevolutionary elements who collude with imperialism, commit treason to the fatherland, and oppose the cause of the people's democracy. Reactionary elements, feudal landlords, bureaucratic capitalists in general must, according to law, also be deprived of their political rights for a necessary period after they have been disarmed and their special power abolished, but they shall at the same time be

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given a means of living and compelled to reform themselves through labor to become new men. If they continue their counterrevolutionary activities, they shall be severely punished.

The Communists carried out a political reorganization of the country, always with an eye toward the removal of opposition. Land reform and the emphasis on production were utilized not only to obtain popular support for the regime by redistributing the land but also to eliminate the landlords as a potential focus of opposition. Initially landlords were stigmatized as being socially and economically "feudal" and exploitative, but as the regime gained strength it began to characterize landlords as actively subversive and "counterrevolutionary." This was because they constituted the rural leadership, both in the open political organization of the countryside and in the secret societies.

Similarly, in urban areas the Communists instituted what by mid-1951 was called "democratic reform." The stated aim was to pave the way for future production and reconstruction by wiping out "feudalistic influences," but again the result was to discredit and remove the traditional leadership, first of dock workers and labor gangs, and later of other urban organizations not yet fully controlled by the Communists. Penetration of the leadership by Communists made it impossible for such organizations to turn to political opposition and subversion.

Five months after its establishment, the Peiping regime began its preparations for a more direct attack on subversion by issuing on February 24, 1950, a law against espionage within the government. The opening statement of this "Directive on the [illegible]servation of State Secrets by Working Person[illegible] of all Levels of Government" declared:

[illegible] Chinese people just now are vigorously carrying [illegible] struggle against imperialism, feudalism, and bu[illegible]cratic capitalism and are devoting themselves to [illegible] and difficult work of reconstruction, while ene[illegible] domestic and foreign are using every possible [illegible]od to spy on and destroy us. In order that our [illegible] may not suffer destruction or damage, work [illegible]nel of all levels of government have the re[illegible]ility of guarding state secrets. Therefore, in [illegible]on to the national security laws, which will be [illegible] and separately promulgated later, this direc[illegible] specially issued.

[illegible] categories of state secrets not to be [illegible]ncluded not only military and diplomatic [illegible] also financial and economic aspects of [illegible] "which ought not to be made public." [illegible] of strict enforcement, the leakage of [illegible] at home and abroad was sharply [illegible]

About three months after government officials were warned to safeguard state secrets, Mao Tse-tung, in a speech to the Party's Central Committee on June 6, 1950, pointedly referred to the coming crackdown on subversion:

All bandits, spies, despots and other counterrevolutionary elements, who are harmful to the people, must be resolutely wiped out . . . . The whole Party and all the people throughout the country must raise their vigilance against the subversive activities of the counterrevolutionary elements.

On July 23, 1950, four weeks after the outbreak of war in Korea, a "Directive on the Suppression of Counterrevolutionary Activities" was promulgated. Lacking precise definition either of categories of crime or of punishments to fit them, this directive set forth the subversive problem as the Communists described it at that time:

In certain areas, especially in some of the newly liberated areas, the remnants of the Kuomintang reactionaries, under the direction of the imperialists, are still employing such methods as armed revolt and secret sabotage, the organization of special agents and native bandits, collusion with local despots, or the inciting of some of the backward elements of the population to unceasing activity against the People's Government and for other counterrevolutionary activities to undermine public order and to endanger the interests of the people and the state. Accordingly it has become one of the main tasks of the moment for people's governments of all levels to undertake positive leadership of the people, determinedly to wipe out all counterrevolutionaries operating in the open or in secret, and to establish speedily the revolutionary order in order to protect the democratic rights of the people and to promote the smooth development of production, reconstruction activities, and other necessary social reforms.

In further preparation for the intense counterrevolutionary campaign of 1951, the regime on September 29, 1950, gave its approval to a "Temporary Procedure for the Registration of Social Groups." Under this procedure, all social groups were required to register with the government, stating their "area of activity and scope and plans of operations." These social groups were defined to embrace 1) people's mass organizations such as peasant associations (see this Chapter, SECTION 52, under The Mass Support Agencies of Government), 2) social welfare groups, 3) art activity groups, 4) scholastic and research groups, 5) religious groups, 6) other groups organized in conformity with the laws of the People's Government. The intent of the law to control all group activity and to insure that these organizations would not become subversive instruments was carried in the proviso that:

All reactionary groups that harm the nation and the people's welfare shall be prevented from organizing; others that register and manifest reactionary conduct shall have their registrations cancelled and be disbanded.

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Shortly after the Chinese "volunteers" entered the Korean war in October 1950, the registration directive was extended to cover individuals suspected of harboring subversive tendencies. "Reactionary elements" required to register included: 1) former officers of political parties on Taiwan, i.e., the KMT, San Min Chu I Youth Corps (the KMT youth corps organized in 1938), China Youth Party, and Democratic Socialist Party; 2) "special service" (intelligence and secret police) personnel of the National Government and of the KMT; and 3) "all other counterrevolutionary elements who have carried on counterrevolutionary activities with the object of undermining the people's democratic cause."

The registration campaign was highly publicized in various ways, including the establishment of well-labeled registration offices throughout the country and the use of exhortations, such as the Shanghai railroad station's 70-foot sign threatening that "Reactionary elements who seek to conceal themselves or refuse registration are pursuing the path of death"! The threat was effective. By mid-February 1951 Canton authorities, for example, claimed that over 20,000 people had registered in that city alone.

"Reactionaries" who cooperated with the regime by inducing others to register or by giving verifiable details on subversive organizations and their activities were promised absolution or remission. The same information obtained through counterintelligence activity would have taken months, if not years, to gather. Instead, the regime quickly acquired sufficient information to open its all-out counterrevolutionary campaign of 1951.

On February 21, 1951, the regime proclaimed its definitive "Regulations for the Punishment of Counterrevolutionaries" with the triple aim of "punishing counterrevolutionary criminals, suppressing counterrevolutionary activities, and consolidating the people's democratic dictatorship." The 21 articles of these regulations were far more severe than all previous directives on the subject. A long series of "crimes," including espionage, counterrevolution, sabotage, murder, and "provocating and instigating acts," were made punishable by death, life imprisonment, or substantial prison sentences. The regulations defined these crimes so vaguely that virtually no Chinese could be absolutely sure that he had not committed at least one of them. The authorities were the sole interpreters of the regulations, being permitted to work by analogy in all cases not listed by name.

The February 1951 regulations set off a five-month nationwide campaign of terror. Mass arrests and executions followed public accusation meetings at which the people were incited to call for the blood of those brought before them. Even according to official Communist figures, tens of thousands were executed, and the total is estimated to have reached 2,000,000 or more victims. Although the authorities were shrewd enough to include a high proportion of common criminals among those executed, their main purpose was to eradicate potential opposition, especially in the remnants of KMT organizations. The campaign was carefully staged, partly to inspire terror and partly to force the masses to identify themselves with the government policy.

A Chinese Communist analysis, made public in April 1951, established four categories of counterrevolutionary cases: 1) special agents who infiltrated various organizations; 2) bandits or the so-called mainland guerrillas; 3) leaders of reactionary religious sects; and 4) corrupt landlords or evil heads of feudal secret societies. The first two categories indicate that this campaign was directed against elements demonstrably subversive because of their espionage, sabotage, or armed activities against the regime. In addition, the broad mantle of "counterrevolutionary" was allowed to settle over the "feudal" landlords remaining after land reform. Religious and secret organizations subsequently bore the brunt when the campaign against the other categories ebbed.

The Communist attack on religious sects centered on two organizations: the Legion of Mary and a native sect called the *I Kuan Tao* (The Consistent Way), both of which the Communists had been unable to infiltrate and control as they had other organizations. The Legion of Mary, a worldwide Catholic lay organization carrying out general social service work as well as religious instruction, became a target because of its Catholic connections, because it held regular closed meetings for confidential discussion of case histories, and because its organization, patterned after the Roman military legion, suggested to the Communists that it was a secret military group. Legionnaires generally refused to enroll in the government-sponsored Progressive Catholic Church established in early 1951. The recalcitrance of legion members and its Chinese name of *Sheng-Mu Ch'ün* (lit., Holy Mother Army) heightened Communist suspicions that the legion was a paramilitary subversive organization. The campaign against the legion was at its height during 1951, was revived in 1954, and received attention in 1960 when the American Bishop James Walsh was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

The *I Kuan Tao*, a secret Buddhist sect, was developed in the north China countryside, possibly within the last two decades. The Japanese used this organization for espionage purposes during their occupation, and the Communists claim that KMT resistance elements infiltrated its leadership

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after the Nationalist collapse. The campaign against the *I Kuan Tao* continued throughout 1951 and was still occasionally mentioned in early 1952.

On June 10, 1951, the 1950 directive against espionage within the government was extended to the populace by "Provisional Regulations on the Protection of National Secrets." Sixteen types of national secrets were listed, and a seventeenth elastic category included "all other state affairs the secrecy of which should be maintained." Anyone disclosing these state secrets was to "be considered as a counterrevolutionary and punished according to the regulations governing the punishment of counterrevolutionaries," and all groups in the country were called upon to ensure the preservation of secrecy. In addition, military and civil administrative units at all levels were directed to set up security organizations composed of local residents for the purpose of protecting these secrets. A year later, on August 10, 1952, the government formalized these organizations and expanded their duties by issuing "Provisional Regulations for Security Defense Committees." These committees were to be based on such units as government organizations, factories, enterprises, schools, and rural villages—i.e., they were to penetrate the lowest strata of the new society, working below the formal administrative apparatus. The security defense committees receive direct guidance from and are responsible to the local public security organization (see this Chapter, SECTION 54, under Police System). Their duties are: 1) to "associate closely with the masses and to teach and make propaganda to guard against traitors, spies, arsonists, and robbers, and to suppress counterrevolutionary activities thereby elevating the political vigilance of the masses," 2) to organize and lead the masses to assist the government and other public security organizations in reporting and keeping surveillance and control over counterrevolutionaries, in order to curtail sabotage by them, 3) to organize and lead the masses to assist the government and other public security organizations in carrying out education on thought reform for the dependents of counterrevolutionaries, thereby winning the dependents' support of government policies and measures, 4) to mobilize the masses in mapping out patriotic pacts, to guard against traitors, and to urge them in serious execution of the facts, for the maintenance of social and public order. Functioning as an added internal intelligence network, committees are not authorized to arrest, detain, search, interrogate, or punish counterrevolutionaries but merely to "investigate, watch, and report."

More recent laws bearing upon the general problem of subversion but which are primarily concerned with more closely defining the responsibilities, duties, and limits of the various enforcement agencies involved include: Regulations on Labor Reform (August 1954), Organic Laws for People's Courts and Procuratorates (September 1954), Regulations on Arrest and Detention (December 1954), and Regulations Governing the People's Police (June 1957). (For further discussion of these laws, see this Chapter, SECTION 54, Public Order and Safety.)

With consolidation of power and as expediency has necessitated, the Communist approach to subversion has undergone some changes. During the initial years of the regime, more direct and violent tactics were used to subdue all centers of actual and potential resistance activities. More recently, persuasive measures have been emphasized to achieve conformity and unquestioned support although the Communist leaders have not hesitated to utilize more forceful means when considered necessary as in the case of Tibet. While the amount of actual subversive activity, in terms of specific acts of opposition, has reportedly decreased substantially during the past 11 years, the counter-subversion campaign has hardly slackened. The Communists have gradually broadened the definition of "counterrevolutionary" to include not only any anti-Party or antigovernment activity but also everything less than active support for the regime and its policies, meting out severe punishment regardless of the individuals' real intentions. Since 1956 the term "rightist" has been used more often than "counterrevolutionary" to single out individuals expressing unorthodox views. While the type of punishment meted out may not be as severe when the individual is classified a "rightist" rather than a "counterrevolutionary," the knowledge that the regime is able to shift the terminology with ease has an equally deterrent effect on the incidence of subversive activities.

The Communist regime also has carefully elaborated controls limiting the physical possibility of subversive activities among the general population. Travel has been made difficult and dangerous by a system of domicile permits that is stringently enforced. The regime has restricted the flow of uncensored information by requiring licenses for radio equipment, by imposing restrictions on the entry of daily newspapers from Hong Kong, by invoking postal censorship, and by limiting and closely watching contacts of Chinese nationals with foreigners.

In addition to various general laws and police measures promulgated since 1949 which prohibit anti-Party and antigovernment activities, the Chinese Communists have devised an exceedingly comprehensive method for identifying and controlling popular attitudes inimical to the regime. The process involves fundamentally an attempt to sub-

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ordinate the individual to the will of the state. Through the mechanism of regular *hsueh-hsi* (study) sessions, indoctrination meetings, "socialist education" campaigns, and special national "study periods," the regime systematically exposes the individual's thoughts and beliefs to the careful scrutiny of disciplined Party personnel and simultaneously inculcates him with current policies.

Many overlapping indoctrination activities now constitute a part of the everyday life of the average Chinese. Individuals are not permitted merely to attend any meeting such as the *hsueh-hsi* sessions as spectators, but are compelled to participate actively in the proceedings. Reluctance to do so is viewed as a sign of harboring ill thoughts toward the regime whereas overexuberance is regarded as a false demonstration of support. Refugees from mainland China have indicated that it is often very difficult to determine what response is expected when attending, for instance, the daily indoctrination meetings of a school faculty. The individual is constantly made aware of the existence of a narrow line of conformity expected of him but is never told precisely what the limits are. Such sessions engender anxiety/guilt complexes in participants, who are torn between the almost equal dangers of confession and of silence, and who are constantly forced in effect to throw themselves on the mercy of their fellow citizens and on the current and future interpretations of the Party line. An excellent example of this process is the manner in which the "Let All Flowers Bloom"* program developed during 1957. Most people, and particularly the intellectuals and educated classes, were led to believe that open criticism of the regime was sincerely invited. Not until the criticism reached serious proportions, however, did the regime establish rules for confining the limits of the critical views expressed.

This process has resulted in the creation of a social and political atmosphere dominated by fear, suspicion, and uncertainty. Further, children are exhorted to report any wrongdoings of their parents, youths are taught to distrust their elders, and the older generation have had all their expectations of a secure family position radically changed. Such conditions have the effect of completely undermining the will of the average individual. In addition, the constant surveillance of the individual by dedicated and disciplined Party and other loyal personnel gives the regime a highly effective means for immediately identifying potential centers of resistance and taking appropriate countermeasures. It also provides the regime a means of maintaining close contact with the populace in order to estimate the impact of its policies and to gauge the need for modifying certain of its features. Finally, this process of exposing the individual to incessant open criticism provides the Chinese Communists with public affirmation of any punishment rendered.

* The phrase "Let All Flowers Bloom" is a Chinese equivalent for inviting all shades of opinion to be expressed, for example, on a specific government policy.

D. Extent of dissidence under the Communists

Opposition to the Communist Chinese regime has ranged from open rebellion to passivity. The clearest form of opposition, that of open defiance and subversion of regime policies, has varied from the full-scale rebellion in Tibet to isolated instances of economic sabotage and riots. Some incidents have been organized efforts to resist local authority of the regime while others have been spontaneous outbursts short-lived in nature. Although in a closed society of this nature reliable data are difficult to obtain, and it is impossible accurately to gauge the level of the threat to the regime, it is possible to identify the areas of primary activity. The map, FIGURE 57–1, based on reports during 1957–60, indicates the principal areas of incidents, while the chart, FIGURE 57–2, shows the number and types of incidents reported. The antirightist campaign of 1957 accounted in part for the relatively high level of incidents reported that year. By the end of the 3-year period the number of incidents reported had dropped substantially. The types of opposition during this period changed character drastically (see FIGURE 57–2). Aside from the Tibetan revolt, which locally accounted for a high level of armed resistance during 1959 (see FIGURE 57–1), there was a marked shift in the pattern of reported incidents away from open opposition. Comparable data for the first nine months of 1960 indicate that the number and types of incidents have remained about the same as in 1959.

There is ample evidence of the prevalence of passive opposition in Communist China today. The revolutionary features of the Communist system have constituted such an abrupt departure from traditional practices that continuous goading and intimidation of the population to evoke their allegiance and support is a necessary part of the programs followed. The regime has found it necessary to use mass persuasive measures devised to identify the aspirations of the public with Communist goals. Organizations embracing all social and occupational groupings and often overlapping are designed to indoctrinate the population with the proper outlook. Even this has not been sufficient as evidenced by the fact that the regime has found it necessary to supplement regular mass propaganda techniques with such measures as na-

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

FIGURE 57–1. DISTRIBUTION AND INTENSITY OF REPORTED INCIDENTS OF OPPOSITION, COMMUNIST CHINA, 1957–59

tionwide "socialist education" study sessions, "volunteer" labor drives on construction projects, and "back to the farm" retrenchment programs for the bureaucracy.

Passive opposition to the regime has been compounded by the recent growth of apathy and deliberate slowdowns in work. A primary factor has been the effect of two bad harvest years and the resultant food stringency on a populace already drawn tight through a decade of self-denial, production campaigns, and *hsueh hsi.* Refugees and recent visitors to the mainland have given vivid descriptions of genuine malnutrition among significant segments of the populace and starvation in some areas. The gravity of the situation is further reflected in the unprecedented efforts of the regime to purchase large volumes of foodstuffs from nonbloc countries. These adverse food conditions undoubtedly add to the existing passive opposition to the regime. Reliable evidence indicates that the regime has curtailed some of its plans and has made adjustments in certain sectors of the economy.

The existence of the Government of the Republic of China creates some dissidence among the mainland Chinese population. In recent years, however, G.R.C. subversive activities have been limited in large part to intelligence collection and propaganda activities rather than sabotage or guerrilla warfare. (See NIS 39B, SECTION 56, under For-

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eign Intelligence, for a comprehensive description of the formal organizational apparatus of the G.R.C. on this subject.) Such operations have included landing of agents, dropping of leaflets and "relief gifts," and aerial reconnaissance. Although some Chinese Nationalist agencies have maintained contact with remnant Nationalist troops located in Burma along the southern border of China and have supplied them with material aid, the subversive potential of these forces is very limited, their activities being confined primarily to occasional raids on local villages.



FIGURE 57–2. NUMBER AND TYPES OF REPORTED INCIDENTS OF OPPOSITION, COMMUNIST CHINA, 1957–59

1. **Uprisings and armed revolts**

a. TIBET — The most notable instance of organized resistance against the Peiping regime to date occurred in March 1959 when long-smouldering dissidence in Tibet broke out into open rebellion (see the map, FIGURE 57–3). The Chinese Communists had invaded Tibet in 1950 and formally annexed it in 1951. However, on grounds that immediate dissolution of the traditional Tibetan political and religious system would cause popular unrest and resentment, the Peiping regime made a considerable effort to convince the Tibetans and other Asians that Tibetan autonomy would be preserved and that Tibet's religion and traditions would be respected. In practice the Chinese Communists exerted continuous efforts to weaken the authority of Tibet's religious and political leaders and to institute "reforms" which would transform this Himalayan kingdom into a Communist vassal. (For a discussion of the structure of government in Tibet under the Communists, see this Chapter, SECTION 52, under Tibet.)

Historically, Tibet has been one of three large border areas (the others are Mongolia and Sinkiang) over which successive Chinese governments have wielded various degrees of control. Early in their advance across the China mainland, the Chinese Communists announced that Tibet was an integral part of China and would be "liberated



FIGURE 57–3. RESISTANCE IN TIBET, 1956–60

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from the imperialists." A year after Communist seizure of power, Chinese Communist armies on October 7, 1950, attacked without provocation small and isolated garrisons in eastern Tibet despite Tibetan efforts to negotiate peaceably an agreement on Tibetan status under the Peiping regime.

Subsequent Chinese Communist encroachments upon traditional governmental and religious institutions in Tibet caused a steady heightening of tensions and occasional outbreaks of hostility. A formal agreement in 1951 between Peiping and Tibetan authorities guaranteeing the existing political system and respect for religious beliefs was contravened, for example, when the Chinese Communists assumed direct military control over the eastern half of Tibet, otherwise known as Chamdo, a move which was construed by local leaders as an attack upon the traditional foci of control and authority in this region. While Tibetan reaction at this time was largely passive in nature, it also included direct obstruction to the Communist "reforms"; individuals were encouraged by local leaders, for example, not to abide by stated instructions. The physical presence of large contingents of People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops in the major cities of Tibet also constituted a daily irritant and reminder of Peiping's military occupation. From time to time, pack trains and truck convoys would be attacked by tribal elements but apparently not in sufficient force to seriously threaten Communist control. Contrary to tradition, the Chinese Communists vested the Panchen Lama with additional authority which circumscribed the Dalai Lama's dominant power position. Many Tibetans refused to recognize this derogation of authority and continue their obeisance to the Dalai Lama. The establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR) in 1956 also caused great resentment.

The full measure of hostility generated by these moves, however, was not publicized by the Chinese Communists until April 1959 after the rebellion in Lhasa had been crushed. On the eighth of that month the commander of Chinese Communist troops, who had been stationed in Tibet since 1950 admitted that Tibetan resistance to Peiping's "reforms" had begun as early as 1951. Overlooking Communist contraventions of the 17-point agreement signed in 1951, he stated that despite the accord the Tibetan Local Government under the Dalai Lama had obstructed Peiping by all manner of pretexts. The commander went on to refer specifically to difficulties faced by the Chinese Communists in reorganizing the Tibetan army and in introducing various social "reforms." He asserted (Peiping's interpretation) that the formation of military and administrative committees in Tibet to carry out the "reforms" was allowable under the 1951 agreement. He noted that formation of the committees had been delayed by Peiping while "waiting for understanding by the Tibetans," contrary to the prevailing non-Communist view that postponement was forced by Tibetan opposition. The military leader stated that in 1954 the Dalai Lama's government had taken the initiative in proposing reductions in the size of the Tibetan army and its reorganization but instead during the succeeding four years had "rallied rebels" to expand this army. He also mentioned the existence of incessant opposition of the "upper strata" to social "reforms," in addition to saying that in 1952 dissident Tibetans, including some Tibetan officials, had formed a "people's conference" which asked that the Chinese Communists end their occupation of Tibet. There is evidence that this latter reference was to the Tibetan patriotic organization called *Mimang*—translated as "the people" or "the masses" or "the majority"—which, according to Tibetan refugees in India, played an important role in the Tibetan resistance movement.

Early in 1956 the instances of resistance to Chinese Communist "reforms" finally erupted in a major armed uprising in the Kantze area of Szechwan province, a region east of Tibet inhabited by Tibetans belonging to the Khamba tribe (see FIGURE 57–3). Peiping had ordered the formation of collective farms in this area, and an attempt was made to disarm the tribesmen and to undermine the authority of the monasteries and local chieftains. The Khambas, believing that their national customs and religious traditions were endangered, began guerrilla warfare against the Communists, raiding supply convoys and ambushing detachments of troops. This fierce and traditionally independent tribal people are settled throughout a large region which embraces part of Szechwan, Tsinghai, and Tibet. News of resistance in one area was rapidly transmitted to other sections where the Khambas resided. At first the Communists denied that these revolts were taking place, but later they admitted that reports brought to Kalimpong and other Indian border towns by Tibetan refugees and traders had been substantially correct. In December 1956, for example, Chou En-lai at a press conference in Calcutta denied reports of a revolt in Tibet but acknowledged that there was a "lack of understanding" by groups of people in Szechwan and that an armed conflict had occurred between Chinese Communists troops and these people.

Although the Chinese PLA troops confined the area of armed revolt for the time being and generally restorted order, the regime slowed down the process of "socialization." Leading Communist

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officials in late 1956 confided that this process would take a "comparatively long period of time." In February 1957 Mao Tse-tung promised that "reforms" would not be effected in Tibet before 1962 at the earliest, and perhaps not before 1967. This decision was followed in June 1957 by another official statement which promised the withdrawal of "most" of the Chinese personnel working in Tibet. The Communists admitted that they had not consulted sufficiently with Tibetan leaders; they said that "great-Han chauvinism"—the tendency for officials of Chinese nationality to show little respect for members of minority nationalities—had been a serious problem in Tibet. It was apparent that Peiping had adopted a tactical retreat in the face of mounting resentment and open rebellion; even this technique, however, was not adequate to appease Tibetan suspicions.

The Khamba rebels, who by this time had withdrawn to their mountainous strongholds in eastern Tibet and were distrustful of the Communists' concessions, engaged sporadically in guerrilla resistance. Reports appearing in Tibetan local papers in mid-1957 confirmed that "only a few" of the monks and chieftains supported "reforms," and that the majority of the people still lacked enthusiasm for them. In 1958 rebel leaders were active in the vicinity of Lhasa destroying communications and attacking Communist troops, indicating that the early 1956 resistance movement had either been enlarged or new centers of disturbance had developed. As the scope of rebel activities increased and local leaders gained confidence, Chinese Communist officials became increasingly aware that normal security precautions would not be sufficient to control the situation.

Full-scale revolt broke out in Tibet in March 1959. Peiping had applied pressure on the Dalai Lama and his cabinet, ordering them to disown the rebel activities and to use the tiny, ill-equipped Tibetan army against the guerrillas—a largely symbolic action, intended to demonstrate that the Dalai Lama supported the Communists. Available information indicates that during March reports circulated in Lhasa that the Communists planned to abduct the Dalai Lama and to keep him as a hostage in order to intimidate the Tibetans. Local citizens began to hold demonstrations in front of Communist offices in Lhasa on March 10. On March 17 the Dalai Lama with most of his official household slipped secretly from the capital and headed toward rebel territory. Armed rebellion broke out in Lhasa on March 19; the Tibetan people, including monks and Tibetan soldiers, fought against Chinese Communist troops. Chinese reinforcements were rushed in, heavy guns were employed, and planes bombarded several important monasteries in the initial efforts to suppress the rebellion and to gain control of the situation of Lhasa. When the Chinese Communists discovered on March 19 that the Dalai Lama had escaped and was heading for the Tibet-India border, they immediately took additional precautions to block the passes leading to India and ordered thousands of troops to search for him and to put down the rebellion which continued in other parts of Tibet.

On March 28 Peiping abolished the government of the Dalai Lama and established a new local administration nominally controlled by the Preparatory Committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region under the Panchen Lama as the acting chairman. Eighteen members of the preparatory committee were removed and replaced with Tibetan collaborators and Chinese. Although he had fled the capital, Peiping maintained the fiction that the Dalai Lama was still chairman of the Preparatory Committee but in the meantime would permit the Panchen Lama to exercise the Dalai Lama's powers. An initial justification for Peiping's policies in Tibet appeared in a frank revelation of the resistance encountered ever since 1950 when the Chinese Communists first invaded that country. A Peiping communique of March 28 stated:

> The rebellious activities of the Tibetan traitors have been of fairly long duration. These rebels represent imperialism and the most reactionary big serf owners. Since the Chinese People's Liberation Army entered Tibet and the Central People's Government concluded the agreement on measures for the peaceful liberation of Tibet (namely, the 17-point agreement) in 1951, they have been plotting to tear up this agreement and preparing for armed rebellion. . . .
>
> The preparatory committee for the Tibet Autonomous Region was established as early as April 1956. Yet, owing to obstruction by the reactionaries in the local government of Tibet, the preparatory work for the autonomous region has made little progress. . . .
>
> The local government of Tibet is called Kashag in Tibetan and its six members are called Kaloons. Of the six Kaloons, two are patriots: Ngapo Ngawang Jigme and Sampo Tsewong-rentzen, who was wounded by the rebels on March 10. One of the other four, Yuto Chahsidongchu, had already turned traitor in 1956 and fled to Kalimpong—the center of the rebellious elements' activities abroad. The other three, Surkong Wonching-galel, Neusha Thibtentarpa, and Hsika Kigmedorje, came out into the open as traitors in the present rebellion. Before this, these traitors had used their legal status in the Kashag to muster the reactionary forces of the upper strata, collaborate with the external enemy, and actually direct some of the most reactionary big serf owners in Sikang and Tibet in organizing armed rebel forces in certain regions east, north, and south of the Tsangpo (Brahmaputra) River to oppose the Central People's government and betray the motherland. . . .

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> After concentrating considerable counterrevolutionary forces in Lhasa, they started armed rebellion on March 10, openly scrapping the 17-article agreement. . . .
>
> These reactionary elements not only did not in the least repent, but decided to extend the rebellion. They blatantly abducted the Dalai Lama from Lhasa and launched an all-out attack on the People's Liberation Army units stationed in Lhasa on the night of March 19.

Of interest is the admission, despite Communist efforts to surround the Dalai Lama with advisors loyal to the Chinese Communists, that four of the six members of the Dalai Lama's *Kashag* were "traitors."

In view of their failure to obtain and sustain the loyalty of the upper echelons of the Dalai Lama's government, the Chinese Communists contended that an immediate seizure of administrative power was necessary in order to consolidate control. The measures adopted to effect this control were also outlined in the March 28 communique:

> The task at present is first to put down the rebellion and establish peaceful order. . . . In order to wipe out the rebel bandits thoroughly, the State Council (at Peiping) has ordered the units of the Chinese People's Liberation Army stationed in Tibet to assume military control in various places in Tibet. The tasks of the military control committees are: to suppress rebellion; to protect the people and the foreign nationals who observe the laws of China; with the authorization from the preparatory committee for the autonomous region of Tibet and the Tibet military area command of the Chinese People's Army, to set up administrative bodies at various levels of the autonomous region of Tibet; and organize self-defense armed forces of patriotic Tibetans to replace the old Tibetan army of only a little more than 3,000 men which was rotten to the core, utterly useless in fighting, and which has turned rebel.

Thus fully eight years after signing an agreement on the "peaceful liberation" of Tibet, the Chinese Communists have had to form military control organizations to enforce their rule and to suppress continuing Tibetan resistance.

By June 1960, 15 months after it was decided to "accelerate socialization," there were still reports of armed resistance. When the revolt occurred in 1959, Peiping had an estimated 50,000 troops in Tibet who were concentrated in major cities and along strategic communication and transportation routes. This number was doubled shortly after the revolt, and these forces have been used to ferret out and destroy pockets of resistance. In addition to blocking off passes leading to India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, the Chinese Communists have improved existing transportation routes and apparently constructed new motor roads along the Tibetan perimeter. Garrisons and guardposts have been established on a much larger scale in an effort to subdue roving bands of guerrillas and to consolidate effective military control. The nature of the terrain, climatic factors, unfamiliarity with the region, and logistic difficulties, however, have evidently made the problem of eliminating all forms of resistance quite difficult. In any case, small groups of Tibetans, probably operating independently of each other but with the common aim of opposing Chinese Communist rule are still carrying out limited resistance activities which consist primarily of disrupting communications lines, raiding supply trucks, and attacking isolated outposts.

One firm indication that Tibetan rebels were still active in June 1960 occurred when Chinese troops, purportedly pursuing some remnant rebel units near the Nepal border, killed a Nepali official and captured 10 local citizens. A subsequent official apology stated that Chinese Communist forces had been attempting to annihilate remaining Tibetan guerrillas since the spring thaw opened the passes, and expressed confidence that all guerrillas would be wiped out by July 1960.

b. OTHER AREAS — Almost without exception the other reported uprisings and armed revolts have occurred among ethnic and religious minorities in northwestern China. This concentration of open acts of defiance reflects not only the distinct cultural patterns and historical separateness of this region from central Chinese governments but also the immense geographical difficulties facing the Peiping regime in policing the area. Strong religious beliefs rooted primarily in Mohammedanism and the physical isolation of this region from the principal population centers in China have provided these peoples with the philosophical background and outlook for resisting Communist encroachments. Because of the area's isolated position, its rugged terrain, and the poor transportation and communications facilities, the opportunities for small bands of men and remote religious centers to mount resistance activities are greater in this general region than in most other parts of mainland China. Intimately related to this situation has been the inability of the regime to completely proscribe the possession of firearms and such other weapons as have customarily been used for hunting and personal protection. These factors figured importantly before the Communists seized power in 1949 and have continued to present serious problems under the totalitarian rule of the Peiping regime.

As with previous Chinese governments, the remote northwestern province of Sinkiang (organized since 1955 as the Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region) has presented the Peiping regime with many difficult problems. These problems generally stem from the efforts of the Communists

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to exercise more direct control over regional affairs. Traditionally, as with other minority areas of mainland China, Sinkiang had pursued somewhat independent policies while simultaneously professing allegiance to the central government in Peiping. Under the Communists the status of the area has been changed radically in concept to provide a closer correspondence of policy implementation in the autonomous region with specific national objectives enunciated by the regime. The reaction encountered and strains induced, as a result of the changed relationship, has ranged from open revolt to isolated instances of resistance which have often required the use of military forces to suppress.

The most recent evidence of organized resistance activities, and symptomatic of the deep-rooted resentment caused by Communist authoritarianism, are partially corroborated reports of simultaneous uprisings in Khotan and Kuldja (south- and northwestern Sinkiang, respectively) in 1959. Russian refugees from Sinkiang reported in late 1959 that PLA forces required over two weeks in the early months of that year to bring under control an armed group led by Muslim leaders that had attacked and subdued both local police units and a small army garrison in Khotan. According to these reports over 1,000 persons participated in this revolt, inspired by the belief that the Communists were undermining the authority of Islam. Another group of 5,000 under the control of a local tribal leader in the Kuldja region were also said to have revolted against the Communists at about the same time. Reports had it that it took the PLA over two months to suppress this uprising, even with the use of airplanes. Fifteen persons holding high positions in the Sinkiang government were said to have been arrested, while leaders of the revolt were ruthlessly killed.

Partial corroboration of these refugee accounts can be found in official Chinese Communist reports of March 1959. A prominent Sinkiang newspaper, in commenting upon the arrest of two Muslims for "counterrevolutionary" activities, conspicuously admitted that a number of "counterrevolutionaries" were still concealed in religious circles and that it could be expected that some of these and other "reactionaries" would fabricate rumors out of this case to incite the masses seditiously. The two Muslims were accused of trying to sabotage the cooperativization movement, planning open revolt in the hope of overthrowing the people's government, setting up a so-called "Islamic government," harboring other counterrevolutionary elements, and obtaining aid from "enemies in foreign lands." The newspaper account also commented that the two prisoners recruited members for their counterrevolutionary organization from among those released from labor reformatories, "rightists," and other such "enemies." It also mentioned that at the height of an economic drive in the fall of 1958, these two men ordered their associates to revolt in Kuldja but that their plans were foiled by the public security forces.

In December 1959 another instance of organized resistance to the Peiping regime was publicized for the first time when the governor of Tsinghai Province, bordering on the northeastern corner of Tibet, reported at the Tsinghai People's Congress that a revolt in 1958 was "quickly put down by the PLA" and that "livestock owners and religious groups" were blamed for the event. According to the report:

> Under the pretext of safeguarding the interest of minority religions, the rebels mounted their operations from monasteries, coerced the masses, attacked the Tsinghai People's Government, murdered revolutionary cadres and activists, destroyed pastures and livestock, burned houses, committed rape and robbery, and massacred the masses.

The governor also related that "severe measures" were taken against the leaders and participants in the rebellion.

The rebellion was triggered by government efforts to force livestock holders and cattlemen into cooperatives, thereby confiscating their property. Available information does not indicate whether the regime anticipated some opposition to these measures or completely miscalculated the strength of the resistance encountered, but the program did result in armed rebellion. The fact that it was not reported for over a year and a half after it occurred is probably indicative of the deleterious aftereffects the rebellion had on the regime's efforts to push through its policies.

In mid-October 1958 Peiping announced that four "counterrevolutionary" revolts had occurred in the area now known as the Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region (NHAR) of northwestern China: one in May 1950, another in April 1952, and the others in April and June of 1958 (see the map, FIGURE 57–4, for location). This information appeared about a month after a 3-week session attended by over 400 representatives of the Hui (Chinese Muslims) people and called by the Communists had "exposed" the "anti-Communist, antipeople, and antisocialist crimes" of Ma Chen-wu, a local religious leader from the Ningsia region. The identification of Ma Chen-wu as the ringleader of these revolts was publicized just one week before the NHAR was formally established, and the timing has been viewed as designed to warn the Hui people not to mistake the meaning of autonomy under the Chinese Communist minority policy.

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

FIGURE 57–4. LOCATION OF REPORTED MUSLIM REVOLTS, 1950–58

The nature of the revolts and the various "crimes" attributed to Ma Chen-wu illustrate the extent of Muslim resistance to the Chinese Communists. Peiping claims that Ma Chen-wu planned the "counterrevolutionary armed revolt" of May 8, 1950, in collusion with "counterrevolutionaries" of the P'ingliang area (see FIGURE 57–4 for details). These persons reportedly induced some local citizens to oppose actively the stationing of Communist troops in the area. Ma Chen-wu was also accused of engineering the armed revolt of April 2, 1952, in the Kuyuan Special District near P'ingliang. He and various associates were accused of publicly supporting the land "reform" movement, but secretly seeking to sabotage the program and threatening with reprisals those likely to cooperate actively.

Six years later another and apparently more serious revolt occurred in a Hui Autonomous Hsien (county) then in Kansu province, also near the locale of the 1950 revolt (see FIGURE 57–4). This rebellion of April 4, 1958, revolving ostensibly around the question of preserving the tombs of Mohammedan leaders, involved, according to Communist reports, several hundred "counterrevolutionaries" who were inspired by the slogans, "kill all cadres, burn all granaries, and plunder all cooperatives and trading companies." The regime claimed that the revolt was rapidly suppressed with the help and close cooperation of the Hui people.

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The most recent reported revolt is said to have occurred only two months later on June 1, 1958, when the Muslims of another county in the present NHAR attempted to establish a Muslim republic in Ningsia and to form a "reactionary" organization called the "Islamic Democratic Party." Ma Chen-wu also was accused of engineering this anti-Communist uprising which sought "to win glory for Islam." Ma supposedly recruited dispossessed landlords, ex-KMT officials, and others opposed to the Communists' plans and "cloaked" them as professional religious leaders and sheltered them in mosques for "counterrevolutionary" activities. He allegedly used his "feudal" influence to persecute people, arranged many religious observation days (reportedly 65 a year), during which time inhabitants were kept from working in the fields, and also asked them to contribute donations for the maintenance and support of the mosques and religious leaders. As a religious leader, he was further accused of forcing cooperative members to leave their work during the harvest season and contribute free labor on his land in addition to extorting funds from his followers for the repair of tombs. Ma was punished by being deprived of all titles to public office, along with all privileges formerly accorded to him as titular religious head. All land, domestic animals, and property owned by his followers and the Muslim mosques were also confiscated.

An expulsion in September 1960 of high-level officials from the government of the Ningsia Hui Autonomous Region indicated that the measures taken in 1958 had not effectively curbed Muslim resentment against the Communist regime. At that time, the regional government chairman, Liu Ko-p'ing, a veteran member of the Chinese Communist Party and a major expert on minority affairs, was dismissed, along with several of his subordinates.

2. Sabotage and riots

Since the Communists seized power in 1949, there have been periodic reports of acts of apparent economic sabotage and deliberate obstruction of various industrial programs. Neither the magnitude nor seriousness of such acts can be surmised from the limited information available, but it is apparent that they stem from individual grievances and are not related to each other. Incidents include food contamination, destruction of machinery, burning of granaries, and the like. The regime seeks to conceal such evidence of individual resentment from the outside world, but seeks to utilize these incidents in most instances for internal propaganda purposes. It strives to shift blame for poor management and planning to individuals who are singled out for castigation and punishment. In other instances, the regime evinces genuine concern with eliminating the irritants that caused the hostile acts. Because of the pressures placed upon the individual to improve his performance, however, there is little likelihood that incidents of this nature will disappear from the Chinese Communist scene under present circumstances.

In an example of overt demonstrations against regime authority, a large body of students led by school officials rioted for three days in central China in mid-1957. Over 1,000 persons participated in the riot, which included ransacking of local Party and government offices, assaulting of officials, and breaking into an arsenal. Participants labeled the riot as the "Hungarian incident in miniature." Ostensibly protesting a decision in 1957 to limit the number of secondary school graduates who could continue their education, and taking advantage of the liberalized atmosphere that prevailed for a short time in that year (see above, under Chinese Communist Sanctions Against Subversion), the students released their pent-up grievances in this vain action. All the information relating to this riot was publicized by the regime three months after it happened at which time the leaders were publicly executed and others were imprisoned.

E. Sources of discontent among various groups

The totalitarian and revolutionary Chinese Communist regime, now in power for more than 10 years, has been seeking to carry out a sweeping program of social and economic change aimed at making China a strong, modern industrial state. In terms of popular reactions and attitudes, the revolutionary programs and policies of the regime have had both a positive and a negative aspect.

On the positive side, the regime has to date succeeded in unifying the country and in creating a stable political system, after decades of war and political chaos. It has made significant efforts to control floods, famines, and pestilence (but natural disasters have caused extensive crop failures and a serious food shortage). It has created the strongest military establishment in Asia and has appealed to nationalistic sentiments among the population by defying Western military power and by expelling Western influences from the mainland of China. These accomplishments of the new regime, combined with its dynamic approach to domestic problems, probably have generated enthusiasm and support among some younger groups in the population, who are less sophisticated, less tied to traditional values, and more susceptible to Communist propaganda.

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On the negative side, the revolutionary programs of the regime have had a very disruptive effect on Chinese society, destroying many of the institutions which provided a stabilizing influence. The Communists have deliberately tried to destroy or modify many traditional institutions and values, including Confucianism, the traditional family system, and traditional religious customs. This effort to modify traditional patterns of life has generated resentment among the older groups in the population, particularly among the intellectuals and in the rural areas, and has offended the sensibilities of ethnic minority groups, who have traditionally resisted acculturation by the Han Chinese.

Another major factor contributing to the growth of popular discontent has been the regime's unceasing efforts to maintain a high pitch of tension among the adult sectors of the population through incessant propaganda and political indoctrination and through forced participation in "mass" drives and campaigns involving millions of persons. In recent years the average peasant worker has been forced to labor to the point of physical exhaustion, and at the same time his "spare" hours have been taken up by compulsory attendance at Communist-sponsored political meetings.

By mobilizing and regimenting the entire adult population, the regime has been able to harness a tremendous amount of human energy for its social and economic programs. At the same time, however, the enormous and largely uncompensated sacrifices which it has demanded of the populace have produced widespread resentment and a general attitude of apathy and dissidence among large segments of the population. Nonetheless, in recent years the regime has in the main been able to direct this resentment and discontent into relatively harmless channels. Given the all-pervasive system of political and social controls which the regime has created, there is little opportunity for this popular discontent to erupt into effective resistance activity. Perhaps a more immediate danger to the regime arises from the possibility that popular apathy may act as a brake, forcing the regime to modify or postpone some of its basic social or economic programs.

1. Peasants

The amorphous peasant population, which comprises the overwhelming majority of the mainland Chinese, has probably been subjected to greater disruptive pressures than any other social group. The number of persons eliminated during the land reform period of 1950–52 has not been accurately reported, but various fragmentary data are available which give indications of the scope of resistance involved. For example, according to Mao Tse-tung's statement of February 1957, 800,000 were liquidated by security forces during the period 1949–54. Other evidence confirms that the most violent and ruthless phases of the land-reform program occurred in the initial years and that the figure quoted by Mao can be regarded as a reliable index of the magnitude of the resistance encountered. While a considerable number of those affected by the land reform program were "landlords," and thus outside the generally accepted definition of "peasants," the great majority were so-called "rich peasants" and other "reactionary" elements in the countryside. These persons had the most to lose by the land reform program and naturally resisted regime attempts to seize, confiscate, and redistribute property. Although Mao's statement was an obvious attempt to dispel the widely held views that several millions succumbed during the campaign, his estimate does not reveal its actual dimensions. Millions of peasants were pauperized, humiliated, and physically maltreated. A large amount of farm capital—draft animals, tools, stores of grain—was also destroyed by the landholders in anticipation of the land reform and through mismanagement and neglect of the new owners.

The brutal suppression of groups resisting these policies, the formation of irregular courts to try those accused, and the use of terror largely deprived the peasant of the will to resist. Moreover, the means for carrying out organized or even unorganized resistance were destroyed—for example, all secret societies were formally banned and all firearms were collected with severe penalties imposed on those who refused to comply. The formation of new social and occupational groupings, forced participation in "study sessions," the omnipresence of both local security forces and disciplined cadres, and incessant propaganda have also served the objective of eradicating nonconformity with the regime's policies. Although such policies have also induced resentment, disaffection, and dissidence among other social and economic groups in mainland China, the brunt of these measures has been borne by the peasants.

A period of consolidation of control set in after the land reform programs had been virtually completed by 1952. The early mutual-aid teams, involving no more than a temporary pooling of labor during the busy farming season, were merged into agriculture producer cooperatives. Published reports during this period indicated that many peasants were not joining the cooperatives voluntarily. Some objected to the regime's program of grain purchase and distribution while others became disenchanted with unfulfilled promises to relieve the food situation. These and other problems associated with establishing cooperatives forced the

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regime to admit by mid-1955 that only 14% of the farm population had joined them.

The failure of the 1954 grain crop multiplied the organizational problems connected with the cooperatives and provided additional sources of unrest and discontent among the rural population. Official reports indicate that during 1954–55, resistance activities in the countryside included sabotage of rural cooperatives, burning of government granaries, murdering of local cadres and officials, inciting the peasants to revolt, and stealing of state property. Combined with similar acts of sabotage and resistance among other sectors of the population, this period proved to be the most critical thus far in terms of retaining political control over the population. Many of the reported "counterrevolutionary" crimes appear, however, to have been rather trifling offenses which were deliberately exaggerated or distorted in order to provide "object lessons" to the general populace. In any case, by mid-1955, when Mao Tse-tung at the National People's Congress expressed dissatisfaction with the pace of cooperativization, the whole process of "socializing" the countryside was suddenly accelerated. Within a period of 18 months, over 96% of all peasant households were collectivized.

Organizational changes ordered from 1956 through early 1958 suggest that the collectives were neither popular nor fully stable. The accelerated agricultural development drive of 1956 was in many respects ill-advised with major blunders apparent in most localities. New methods of cultivation, for example, which by Peiping's own later admissions were often arbitrarily and unsystematically applied, were resisted by the peasants. Other difficulties arose in the distribution of the collective income, in work assignments, and in training of personnel, all giving rise to suspicions and jealousies among villages and neighborhoods. There was mounting dissatisfaction among peasants because of the low incomes and hard work in the collectives.

At the end of 1956 and in early 1957 many collectives were dissolved, reflecting the rising level of peasant discontent. A series of directives were issued calling for organizational changes, including the reduction in size of collectives to a suggested "optimum" of about 100 families, and prescribing various measures to reduce the disparity of family incomes, improve management, and ease dissension. A "back-to-the-farm" move in late 1957 sent over 1,000,000 cadres to the rural areas which, in addition to streamlining the central bureaucracies and disciplining deviationists, reinforced the local administrative structure in the countryside. After a series of conciliatory adjustments to the collectivization setbacks the regime in 1958 embarked upon an economic drive of major magnitude, referred to as a "leap forward." A principal feature of this drive was the sudden emergence of the commune program in August 1958 (see this Chapter, SECTION 55, under Domestic Policies, for full discussion of the commune program).

A major increase in peasant dissidence occurred as a result of the speedy introduction of this revolutionary rural organizational concept. One month after the movement commenced, Peiping announced that over 90% of the peasants, or about 112,000,000 households, had been organized into some 24,000 communes. By early November, according to official reports, 99% of the rural population had been communalized. The commune program uprooted the peasant, often moving him out of his house and village, deprived him of his land and his work, and forced him to replace traditional family activities for communal enterprises. Numerous official Chinese Communist reports in late 1958 and in the early months of 1959 admitted that the communes were a major source of peasant irritation. Most resented the separation of parents from their children and shortcomings of the messhalls (poor food, inefficient management); some disliked assignment to various chores; many doubted that their children and older members of the family would be properly cared for. Refugees entering Hong Kong told of husbands and wives being separated, food being rationed in large amounts in the beginning but gradually reduced to the bare minimum for subsistence, long working hours, and inadequate medical attention. In December 1958 Peiping launched a four-month "tidying-up" campaign to consolidate the existing rural communes and to modify some of their more radical features.

Whatever may be the specific level of current peasant discontent, all indications suggest that it is not at present a serious threat to the commune system itself, and that the Party through minimal concessions and tight control has been able thus far to implement the basic features of the system.

2. Intellectuals and students

Not only have regime policies caused mixed reactions among the intellectuals, but their middle-class origins and contact with Western ideas have made them generally a suspect and politically unreliable group. A great majority of the intellectuals are exceedingly patriotic and therefore influenced by the regime's emphasis on loyalty to the state rather than traditional loyalty to the family and local customs. For many intellectuals the image of a China resurging to a position of dignity and power under the centralized control of a Communist regime undoubtedly has had much appeal. After 11 years of Communist rule, some intellectuals are indisputedly elated by the inde-

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pendent course Peiping has pursued in foreign affairs and in constructively coping with national economic problems. As revealed during the anti-rightist campaign of 1957, however, a number of intellectuals also voice increasing concern over the totalitarian aspects of the current regime, including the muffling of criticism, the destruction of opposition, the subordination of literature, art, and music to the propaganda needs of the state, and the reinterpretation of history according to the Communist scheme of class conflict. An atmosphere of fear and intimidation pervades the Chinese intellectual scene.

This ambivalent reaction of the intellectuals is resultant from their own unique background. Many of the older intellectuals either actively participated in the growth of democratic parliamentary institutions in China or received university training in Western countries. Furthermore, they originate largely from the Chinese middle classes who traditionally have exercised preponderant political and economic power. Many of the influential members of this group are able to contrast Communist techniques and achievements with accomplishments made elsewhere by leaders with different motivations. During the 1957 "All Flowers Bloom" interlude (see above, under Chinese Communist Sanctions against Subversion), many of the older intellectuals criticized the Party's monolithic control of educational institutions and even suggested that if the "English or American type of politics were carried on by Chinese political parties, then the Chinese people would be happy and at peace."

At the same time, however, the administrative and managerial skills of this group have been indispensable to the regime in the implementation of specific programs. It has been necessary to capture the loyalty and imagination of some intellectuals in order to utilize their potentialities. To date, the evidence is that the regime has dealt with this problem with consummate adroitness. Now pre-Communist intellectuals are gradually being replaced by a core of younger people, however, which in turn creates a new sense of insecurity among many older scholars. The regime has attempted to compensate for this situation at least in part by retaining well-known scholars as presidents of universities, for example, but then emasculating their responsibilities and powers by appointing a Party stalwart in actual control as vice president.

Since the early days of the Chinese Communist movement, the Communists have generally had the enthusiastic support of many students. Not until mid-1957 were there any clear indications that this support had eroded. Then wide-scale dissatisfaction was expressed, and there were even riots by middle-school and university students. This discontent appeared directed primarily at the Party's restrictions on student activities, choice of curriculum, and assignments upon graduation. While the regime evidently curbed the criticism voiced at that time, there has been no indication that the sources of discontent have been changed.

3. Ethnic minorities and religious groups

Traditional resistance to change and the inertia found among the minority groups of mainland China have presented the regime with some of the most serious overt manifestations of opposition. Despite conciliatory attempts to cope with the underlying causes, the level of dissidence and general resentment against Communist encroachments remains high. While some of the adverse reaction encountered is similar to that which previous Chinese governments have confronted, most of it has been caused by the revolutionary programs pursued by the Peiping regime. The ethnic minorities, comprising a total population of 36,000,000 and occupying about 50% of mainland China, are now aware that Peiping seeks to destroy their special characteristics and mold them to the Communist pattern.

According to the 1954 Constitution national autonomous areas at different administrative levels were to be formed wherever one (or more) minorities were concentrated (see this Chapter, SECTION 52, for full discussion of governmental apparatus). By 1959 the regime claimed the establishment of four autonomous regions, 29 districts (including joint regions and districts (*chou*) in which two or more nationality groups live together), and 62 countries (*hsien*) encompassing over 90% of all the minorities.

The methods used to implement this nationality policy have incurred various forms of opposition ranging from the organized revolt in Tibet to sporadic village uprisings and reluctance to join cooperatives and communes. A principal facet of imposing central governmental control over these areas has been the "voluntary" migration of Han Chinese from the densely populated coastal provinces to the less populated border regions. At the end of 1958, for example, it was officially stated that since 1955 about 1,380,000 Chinese had taken up permanent settlement in these areas and particularly in Sinkiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia. The case of Inner Mongolia vividly demonstrates how the actual composition of the population has been altered. By 1954 it was estimated that the ratio of Chinese to Mongolians was 3 to 1. With the merging of Suiyuan province into Inner Mongolia in 1954, the ratio was changed to 7 to 1. Although the same degree of change has not occurred in other areas with minority nationalities, the prin-

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ciple of gradual infiltration with Chinese settlers has been applied to all such areas.

This wholesale migration of Chinese has been one of the greatest single sources of resentment among the minority groups, stemming from what is known as "great-Han chauvinism," or the superior attitudes of the Han Chinese toward the local inhabitants, and also stemming from the economic inroads of the new settlers at the expense of the minority group. The regime has recognized this problem and periodically conducts campaigns among its cadres to eliminate this cause of strain. Furthermore, all key posts in administration, as well as in farming and local industry, have been held by Chinese cadres since about 1957.

Another source of resentment among many of the minority groups, and one which also aggravated relations between them and previous Chinese governments, has been the gradual extension of permanent agricultural settlements at the expense of nomadic herdsmens' temporary communities. The formation of cooperatives and confiscation of landholdings in many instances have caused bitter feelings and sometimes have resulted in armed attacks on Chinese outposts, withdrawal from the cooperatives, killing of livestock, and burning of granaries. The forcing of herdsmen into sedentary occupations has invariably disrupted local economic patterns. Agricultural produce and livestock products are channeled into a consumer market area that is controlled by the central government through its state trading corporations rather than by local considerations of supply and demand. Moreover, the construction of railroads and motor roads has facilitated the distribution of such goods over a wider area. The economic integration of these regions combined with the political control exercised by the central government has further reduced their actual autonomy and independence.

Peiping's drive to "unify the motherland" has included the creating of written languages for at least 10 nationality groups, reforming the written language of three others, and replacing the written language of the Uighur, Kazakh, and Mongolian minorities with the Han Chinese language. The adoption of a new script for the Uighur and Kazakh minorities in Sinkiang as late as February 1960 has reportedly evoked the criticism by local leaders that this is just another step toward "assimilation" and that many were opposed to the plan for this reason. This process of language reform is explained in terms of preserving and enriching the intellectual and aesthetic lives of these nationality groups. There seems little doubt, however, from the nature of the criticism made, that such "enrichment" is simply part of the general Communist plan to cause the gradual disappearance of these nationality groups as distinct cultural and linguistic entities.

In addition to being coerced and intimidated into new patterns because of their cultural separateness, the minority groups have been the prime target of the regime's attacks upon organized religion. The regime has often declared a policy of tolerating all forms of religious belief but cynically follows a pattern of deliberate elimination or at least complete control of all established religions in the name of assuring national unity. For example, all minority religious groups have been brought under the centralized control of Peiping through the formation of several intermediary bodies directly administered by individuals who, although professing adherence to the religion involved, are actually loyal supporters of the regime. This technique has cut off Christian sects from their parent groups including a severance of formal ties between the Vatican and Chinese Catholics. It has also served to reduce the influence exercised by local Buddhist and Mohammedan leaders over the adherents of those faiths.

4. Former businessmen

The regime and businessmen have inherently divergent interests. Initially, the dissidence of this group was partially minimized by the belief that civil war and rampant inflation were over and by the regime's promises that private ownership of reasonable amounts of property would continue for an indefinite period. This attitude was replaced by hostility and fear during the Korean war when the "bourgeoisie" were objects of confiscatory taxation and political persecution. Centralized controls over the economy, principally the distribution of products, and allocation of materials and labor, extortionary bond drives, "donations" campaigns, and "counterrevolutionary" purges left the large group of Chinese shopkeepers, traders, manufacturers, and artisans thoroughly intimidated, shorn of all independence, depleted of financial reserves, and at the mercy of the regime.

When the bulk of remaining private commerce and industry was "socialized" in 1956 in the form of joint state-private corporations, there was virtually no overt expression of opposition, although no significant increase in the dissidence of this group was reported. During the subsequent antirightist campaign in 1957 it became apparent that the regime did not consider the "bourgeoisie" resigned to current conditions although, of all segments of the population, business and industrial circles appeared the least enthusiastic about criticizing the Party. Defectors also have reported that while property owners consider resistance futile, their basic lack of sympathy for the regime is unaltered. At the same time, their

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designation as "enemies" by virtue of their class status highly limits the direction in which lack of sympathy for the regime can be translated into action.

5. Workers

Communist China's rapidly growing industrial working class, presently numbering over 20,000,000, has for several years been subjected to constant pressures to increase output. Peiping's propaganda drives have stressed that present strenuous efforts to increase production will afford future abundance, if not for themselves, at least for their children. The regime has praised the worker as the focal point for industrial progress and tried to inculcate the idea that the harder he toils the more he enriches himself. In reality, and in spite of claimed "leaps forward" in production, workers' wages do not appear to have risen substantially; certainly they have lagged behind cited productivity increases as the Peiping regime has sought to maximize amounts allocated for capital investment and to keep at a bare minimum the resources allocated for consumer products. In 1960, the third year of the "Great Leap Forward," the urban worker still found tight rations on cloth, rice, meat, and other necessities. Moreover, the average industrial worker is compelled to attend 2 to 3 hours of indoctrination daily and must "volunteer" to contribute work time on Sundays and holidays.

Balanced against these pressures and continued austerities is the comparison of the industrial workers' lot at present with conditions before the Communist ascendancy. The guarantee of employment, minimal necessities, medical care, and for some workers in favored industries, health centers, resorts, housing, and recreational facilities, in addition to the knowledge that the regime has openly favored the industrial worker, are factors mitigating against discontent.

6. Military forces and demobilized troops

Next to the Communist Party members, the military forces are the most privileged and favored group among the Chinese population. Food and clothing rations of the soldiers greatly exceed those of the peasantry thus making military service attractive to the average inhabitant. Indoctrination is conducted with great care and continuing modernization of weapons is another morale factor.

Shifts in the armed forces' upper echelons during 1958–59, however, suggested that disagreement existed between the Party and military leaders over the professionalization of China's armed forces as opposed to their use as production units on the economic front as well. Moreover, another source of aggravation to professional military men is a requirement that staff officers serve one month every year in the ranks in order to maintain their acquaintance with grievances and the situation of the common soldier. A further source of discontent among the military, and especially among the higher level officers, was a recent decision that all dependents living on garrison posts (reportedly numbering over 800,000 by late 1957) return to their home villages and take up productive work there. Despite these indications of possible discontent among the armed forces, there have been very few military defectors in recent years. The absence of Chinese press reports on service disciplinary problems also suggests that morale among the military is probably good.

Over 5,000,000 military men have been demobilized since 1949. Many have become the mainstay of the militia, police units, and other security forces, but most have been required to resume their former occupations and places of residence. Soldiers stationed in and around municipal centers are reluctant to return to the countryside upon discharge—a fact of particular importance in Communist China where the cities are already overcrowded. Furthermore, over the years an appreciable volume of material on the "rehabilitation" of demobilized servicemen suggests that the regime is confronted with greater discontent among this element than among the regular armed forces.

7. Communist Party and bureaucracy

Over 14,000,000 persons, or somewhat more than 2% of the total population, presently belong to the Communist Party of China. They are the most privileged elite and yet are placed under the severest strains and pressures to carry out policies emanating from the higher levels. Discontent among this group relatively rarely encompasses resistance or direct attacks upon the ruling authority, although there has been some incidence of dissension over certain programs and their specific application.

A notable exception to this pattern, however, was the Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih purge in March 1955. Kao Kang, a member of the Party Central Committee and Party boss of Manchuria, was charged with trying to form an anti-Party faction and with seeking to reorganize the Party and government with himself as Premier. Jao Shu-shih, another high-ranking Party Central Committee member, was accused of starting "a struggle aimed at opposing the leading central comrades" and engaging in obstructionist tactics in the implementation of certain policies. Official reports indicated that large-scale dismissals occurred throughout the Party and government as a result of this particular incident.

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A certain level of discontent among the Party and bureaucracy was revealed in late 1957. Lo Jui-ching, Minister of Public Security, at the conclusion of the antirightist campaign announced that of 100,000 "counterrevolutionaries" and "rightists" uncovered between June 1955 and October 1957 some 5,000 had been members of the Communist Party, including 200 "high-level" functionaries, and 3,000 members of the Communist Youth League. Among this group were a few provincial Party secretaries who were dismissed for not following the Party line adequately with respect to the collectivization program. It has been pointed out that if action of this nature was necessary to cope with dissension in the Party ranks at such a high level, it can be concluded that similar although perhaps not as serious disagreement existed at the lower levels and resulted in the reported dismissals.

Both government cadres and Party members at the local level are particularly susceptible to misgivings about the wisdom of regime policies. They are often forced to lead a life not much different from that of the peasants while being blamed for many failures in the regime's policies. They find themselves caught between the millstones of Peiping's policies and the realities of their immediate environment, and there is evidence that some of them occasionally identify themselves more directly with the peasants than with Party demands. To counter this situation the regime in November 1957 decided to transfer over 800,000 central Party and administrative cadres to the lower echelons. In an obvious effort to bolster the morale of lower-level comrades, it was announced at the same time that the majority of Party members, Youth League members, and "activists" would be assigned to basic level positions. Party and government retrenchment in Communist China has not been uncommon, but the program in 1957 and early 1958 following the rectification and "antirightist" campaign was the largest single drive of its kind.

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F. Comments on principal sources

The chief problem associated with the information available on subversive activities in Communist China is the inability either to confirm or to assess fully its significance. Occasional reports from Western embassies; accounts by visiting Europeans, refugees, and defectors; and letters from mainland Chinese have provided some confirmation of the growth of dissidence, for example, among the rural population. Although much of the information needed for the preparation of this Section is unobtainable or is at the best circumstantial, the fact that Peiping chooses to publicize peasants' dissidence, the disgruntlement of certain intellectuals, student riots, and a number of uprisings is sufficient to identify those areas of disaffection and resentment considered important by the regime. Furthermore, while it is not possible to assess the significance of certain indications of dissidence, the regime itself is apparently unable to foresee the results of its policies as with the case of Tibet.

The chief sources for this Section have been Chinese Communist periodicals and monitored radio broadcasts adjusted for bias whenever other sources were available. The otherwise limited coverage of mainland China through such information has been counterbalanced by the knowledge that all material disseminated internally must be approved by local Party committees attached to every news outlet or agency. Therefore, the statements made are regarded as substantially reflecting the actual situation in Communist China today.

Perhaps the single most important gap in the information available for this Section is that relating to the attitudes of the people toward the regime. At best they can only be approximated with regard to specific groups such as the intellectuals as revealed during the "All Flowers Bloom" period of 1957. That resentment and general dissatisfaction among this group exist is known; whether it is sufficient to materially affect the capacity of the regime to execute its policies, however, is problematical. Similar or even more hesitant conclusions may be drawn about other social groups such as the peasants and workers.

There is a general absence of material on the subversive activities of Overseas Chinese communities and "third force" groups; these groups probably possess very little subversive potential at present.